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 
Abstract— The security of a free-space Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD) system is analyzed by using PRISM, a 
probabilistic model checker. Disturbances and misalignments 
causing an imperfect channel are considered. The security of the 
system is formally demonstrated against intercept-resend and 
random substitution eavesdropping attacks for a particular range 
of transmitted photons. 
 
Index Terms— Cryptography, formal verification, 
probabilistic model checking, quantum key distribution.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ecurity protocols are specifications of communication 
patterns which are intended to let agents share secrets over 
a public network. They are required to perform correctly even 
in the presence of malicious intruders who listen to the 
message exchanges over the network and also manipulate the 
system (by blocking or forging messages, for instance). 
Obvious desirable requirements include secrecy and 
authenticity. The presence of possible intruders imposes the 
use of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic primitives to 
encrypt the communications [1].  
Nevertheless, it has been widely acknowledged that even the 
use of the most perfect cryptographic tools does not always 
ensure the desired security goals. This could be either for 
efficiency reasons or because frequent use of certain long-term 
keys might increase the chance of those keys being broken by 
means of cryptanalysis.  
Secure key agreement where the output key is entirely 
independent from any input value is offered by Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD). Although this technique does not 
eliminate the need for other cryptographic protocols, such as 
authentication, it can be used to build systems with new 
security properties.  
The aim of this work is to analyze the security of BB84 
protocol [2] against two kinds of eavesdropping attacks 
(intercept-resend and random substitution attacks) when 
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implemented in an experimental QKD system. We will 
consider the influence of possible disturbances in the free-
space between Alice and Bob, and misalignments in the optics 
to calculate the probability of detection of the eavesdropper as 
a function of the number of photons transmitted (or 
equivalently, the length of the bit sequence generated by 
Alice). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
includes some preliminaries and definitions. Section III briefly 
outlines the BB84 protocol, describes the actual free-space 
QKD system under development in our labs, and exposes the 
model checking methodology used to analyze its security. The 
calculated results are presented and discussed in section IV 
and, finally, conclusions are derived in section V.  
II. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we include a short explanation about the 
security of QKD systems and the usefulness of formal methods 
to verify its security, and a description of the verification 
software used in this work. 
A. Quantum Key Distribution security 
QKD protocols provide a way for two parties, a sender, 
Alice, and a receiver, Bob, to share a key through a quantum 
communication channel (by means of optical fiber or free-
space links), and detect the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. 
The first complete protocol for QKD, widely used today, was 
BB84, which uses two non-orthogonal bases, each one with 
two orthogonal and linearly polarized states (0º/90º and 
45º/45º, respectively) that encrypt each photon to be 
transmitted [2]. Later on, a simplified version, the B92 
protocol, was also introduced [3].  
QKD allows two distant partners to communicate with 
absolute security. Unlike conventional cryptography, QKD 
promises perfect, unconditional security based on the 
fundamental laws of physics, the non-cloning theorem and the 
uncertainty principle. The security of QKD has been 
rigorously proven in several papers [4]–[6], given some 
assumptions as can be the physical security of 
encoding/decoding devices, a true source of random bits, 
authenticated classical channel to compare bits, and reliable 
single photon emitters and detectors. 
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Unfortunately, building a practical QKD system that is 
absolutely secure is a substantial research challenge. The first 
prototype of a QKD system leaked key information over a side 
channel (it made different noises depending on the photon 
polarization) [7], and more sophisticated side channel attacks 
continue to be proposed against particular implementations of 
existing systems [8]. Furthermore, experiments can be insecure 
because QKD systems in real life are generally based on 
attenuated laser pulses, which occasionally give out more than 
one photon [9].  
Those multi-photon pulses enable powerful eavesdropping 
attacks including the Beam-Splitting (BS) attack [10], or the 
Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack [11], [12]. Information 
leakage caused by BS attacks can be extinguished by privacy 
amplification [13]. To counter the PNS attack several schemes 
have been proposed: The non-orthogonal encoding protocol 
SARG04 [14], the decoy state method [15], [16], or the 
differential phase shift QKD [17]. Other device-independent 
security proofs aim to minimize the security assumptions on 
physical devices [18]–[20]. Very recently, several methods 
have been presented to blind or control the detection events in 
QKD distribution systems that use gated single-photon 
detectors [21], [22], allowing for attacks eavesdropping the 
full raw and secret key without increasing the Quantum Bit 
Error Rate (QBER).  
B. Formal methods 
Thus, despite the existence of a mathematical proof of the 
security of a given protocol, it is necessary to verify that the 
implementation of that protocol in a real system is secure. 
Formal methods allow this task to be developed. 
Formal methods provide a mathematical representation of 
the security functions and the expected behavior of a given 
protocol or system. The two main aspects of formal methods 
are the language that is used to formally express the 
characteristics of the protocol or system (specification 
language), and the way to proof the correct behavior of the 
system according to the formal specification (formal 
verification). The most widely used technique to verify 
security protocols is model checking [23].  
The basic idea of model checking security protocols is to 
build a relatively small model of a system running the protocol 
of interest together with a general intruder model that interacts 
with the protocol [24]. The model checking technique explores 
all possible system states to automatically test whether the 
system model meets the specification. The automated software 
tool is called a model checker. 
 Since quantum phenomena are inherently described by 
random processes, an entirely appropriate technique for 
verification of quantum protocols is probabilistic model 
checking [25]. Probabilistic model checking is a formal 
verification technique for the modeling and analysis of systems 
that exhibit stochastic behavior. It can be applied to several 
different types of probabilistic models. The three most 
commonly used are: Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs), 
in which time is modeled as discrete steps, and randomness as 
discrete probabilistic choices; Markov Decision Processes 
(MDPs), which extend DTMCs with the ability to represent 
nondeterministic behavior; and Continuous Time Markov 
Chains (CTMCs) which does not permit nondeterminism but 
allows specification of real (continuous) time behavior, 
through the use of exponential distributions [26].  
C. PRISM model checker 
 In this work we use PRISM [27], [28] to verify the security 
of a free-space QKD system under development in our labs 
[29]. PRISM is a free and open source probabilistic model 
checker for formal modeling and analysis of systems which 
exhibit random or probabilistic behavior. It was initially 
developed at the University of Birmingham and now at the 
University of Oxford, and supports the three types of 
probabilistic models mentioned above, DTMCs, CTMCs, and 
MDPs, plus extensions of these models with costs and 
rewards. Models are described using the PRISM language, a 
simple, state-based language which subsumes several well-
known probabilistic temporal logics, including Probabilistic 
Computational Tree Logic (PCTL), used for specifying 
properties of DTMCs and MDPs, and Continuous Stochastic 
Logic (CSL), an extension of PCTL for CTMCs. The model 
checker provides support for automated analysis of a wide 
range of quantitative properties of these models, as can be, for 
example, the calculation of the worst-case probability of a 
given protocol terminating in error, over all possible initial 
configurations or the probability that an enemy obtains 
information data on a key in a QKD protocol as a function of 
several parameters. It incorporates state-of-the art symbolic 
data structures and algorithms, based on Binary Decision 
Diagrams (BDDs) and Multi-Terminal Binary Decision 
Diagrams (MTBDDs) [30], [31]. It also features discrete-event 
simulation functionality for generating approximate results to 
quantitative analysis. 
PRISM has been used to analyze systems from a wide range 
of application domains, including quantum protocols. BB84, 
assuming a perfect quantum channel, was examined using this 
method in [32] and [33]. Very recently the security of B92 and 
BB84 quantum protocols have been analyzed in [34] and [35], 
respectively, by considering an intercept-resend attack and by 
calculating the probability that an eavesdropper measures more 
than half the photons transmitted from Alice to Bob, taking 
into account the influence of quantum channel efficiency and 
Eve’s power on the information obtained about the key. 
Similar approaches are presented in [36] and [37] for a 
standard man in the middle attack, showing results about the 
probability to detect the eavesdropper. The same tool has been 
used in [38] to study the security of BB84 protocol in the same 
attacking scenarios analyzed in present paper but calculating, 
for different key lengths, the probability of detection of the 
eavesdropper as a function of a parameter which represents the 
probability of flipping the transmitted bit in its own basis. The 
results of this work predict a lower chance to detect the 
eavesdropper in a noisy channel.  
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this work is to verify the security of BB84 QKD 
protocol when implemented in a practical system. In this 
section we first outline the basics of the protocol. Then we 
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describe the experimental setup and the formal models used to 
simulate it. 
A. BB84 protocol description 
The basic BB84 protocol consists in a first phase, where 
quantum transmissions take place over a quantum channel and 
a second one, where Alice and Bob discuss over a classical 
channel, assumed public, which may be passively monitored 
(but not tampered with) by an enemy [2].  QKD uses polarized 
photons as information carriers. BB84 protocol uses four 
polarizations for the photons: 0 , 1 ,  , and  , grouped in 
two non-orthogonal basis,   for horizontal and vertical 
polarizations, and  , also known as Hadamard basis, for 
diagonal polarizations. The first state of each base corresponds 
to the 0 classical bit value, while the second one corresponds 
to the 1.   
 During the first phase: 
a)  Alice generates a random string of bits d{0,1}n, 
where n is the number of transmitted photons, and a 
random string of bases b{,}n, with n > K, where K 
is the length of the key. 
b)  Alice sends, over the quantum channel, a photon to 
Bob for each bit di in d. For each photon she randomly 
selects a basis bi in b with equal probability so that 
those photons are codified in one of the four above 
mentioned polarizations. 
c) Bob measures each quantum state received with respect 
of each one of the orthogonal basis, chosen at random. 
The choices of bases generate a string b’{,}n  and 
the measurements generate the string d’{0,1}n. 
During the second phase: 
a) For each bit di in d: 
i. Alice sends the value of bi to Bob over a public 
classical channel (an asymmetric channel, for 
example). 
ii. Bob responds by stating whether he used the same 
basis for measurements. If bi’ ≠ bi , both di and di’ 
are discarded. 
b) Alice chooses a subset of the remaining bits in d and 
discloses their values to Bob over the classic channel. If 
the results of Bob’s measurements for any of these bits 
do not match the values disclosed, eavesdropping is 
detected and communication is aborted. 
c) Once the bits disclosed in previous step are removed, 
the remaining bits in d form the final secret key. 
B. Description of our QKD system 
Our experimental free-space QKD setup is currently 
designed to implement B92 protocol at 1 GHz clock rate, and 
we are improving the system to also implement BB84 
protocol. The transmitter in Alice’s module (Fig. 1) is mounted 
on an aluminium base plate. It has two 850nm channels, used 
for the transmission of the key, and a 1550nm channel for the 
synchronizing signal. Those channels are combined by means 
of two pellicles, and the resulting beam is expanded with an 
output telescope, formed by lenses L1 and L2, so that it 
produces a 40mm-diameter diffraction limited spot. The 
expansion of the beam is made to allow a long-distance 
transmission without large beam divergences.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Current Alice’s setup (implementing B92). 
 
The receiver module, Bob, is placed at a distance of 40 m 
from Alice during the preliminary tests (3 km in the final 
system is expected) and, therefore, it receives a diverging 
beam. To efficiently detect the beam a Schmidt-Cassegrain 
telescope of 25.4 cm diameter, 2.5 m equivalent focal distance 
and fine-pointing capability is used. Bob’s optics has been 
designed to be coupled to the output of the telescope by using 
lightweight and compact mounts (see Fig. 2). The output of the 
telescope is connected to Bob’s optics and the outputs of 
Bob’s channels are connected to two single-photon detectors 
by using optical fiber. The optical synchronization pulse is 
detected by an avalanche photodiode. The outputs of all three 
detectors are connected to an electronic card which is able to 
measure the time of arrival of the photons with high temporal 
precision. This information is then sent to Alice from which 
she can infer which key bits have been received by Bob.  
 Especial care must be paid to one of the most critical parts 
of the system, the filtering of the solar background radiation. 
For this purpose, a combination of spectral, spatial, and 
software filtering are used. The spatial filtering is carried out 
by optical fiber (Fig. 2). A good compromise of the diameter 
of this fiber must be found, as small diameters improve the 
filtering of the solar radiation at the expense of higher signal 
losses. In addition, if the diameter is too small the signal could 
be lost due to the beam wandering caused by the fluctuations 
of the index of refraction of the air.  
A non-optimal filtering of the solar radiation can be a 
typical source of noise. In addition, a not optimal alignment 
between Alice and Bob, variations in the atmospheric 
conditions and/or difficulties in the coupling losses can make 
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the channel imperfect, and should be considered in order to 
formally verify the security of the whole system.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Bob’s optics at the output of the receiver telescope, coupling input 
beam to optical fiber. 
 
Although Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show our current experimental 
setup implementing the B92 protocol, all comments in 
previous paragraph about sources of noise and imperfections 
are also valid for the BB84 protocol which will also be 
implemented as an improvement to our system. For this reason 
this is the protocol we simulate in this work. 
C. Formal models 
In order to verify the security of the system described above 
we have to model it in a description language and express its 
desired properties by means of a formula written in a given 
logic. The model and the formula are the input to PRISM, that 
will compute the probability with which that particular formula 
is satisfied by the simulated model.  
According to the experimental setup and the protocol 
described previously in subsection B, we have simulated the 
QKD system in PRISM language. The modeling is 
probabilistic, DTMC, and we have analyzed the probability to 
detect Eve as a function of the channel efficiency and the 
number of transmitted photons (which are assumed to be 
linearly related to the length of the key).  
1)  System model (M): Four modules have been built to 
consider Alice, Bob, Eve, and a communication channel which 
can be imperfect due to disturbances and misalignment losses. 
All those modules have three local variables, corresponding 
respectively to the computational state, the basis with respect 
to which a photon is encoded, and the bit value which is being 
encoded. A fourth variable is added to Alice module to 
simulate the transmission of N photons (each one encoding a 
bit value) as the iteration for N times of the transmission of a 
single photon in a given state. 
2) Desired property: The presence of an eavesdropper must 
be detected by the protocol users. If  is a formula 
corresponding to the event that an eavesdropper is detected, 
the probability of this event in our model M is: 
 
Pdetection = Pr {M (N,PC)  satisfy  } 
 
where PC  is the probability that Eve obtains the correct bit 
value although an incorrect basis is chosen for her 
measurement, and   = true  Bobstate = V, V  being the 
value assigned in the program to the state of Bob when Eve is 
detected. 
3) Attacks: Two different attacks are considered: A typical 
intercept-resend attack [32] and a random substitution attack 
[33]. In the first one, which is the most widely simulated 
eavesdropping attack, we have introduced nondeterminism for 
Alice, Bob and Eve, and we have simulated Bob’s behavior so 
that a comparison is made between his variable of basis and 
that of the channel before Alice reveals her basis; if both 
values are different, then the value of the bit variable in Bob 
module is updated with the value of the bit variable in channel 
module (0 or 1) with a probability PC, and with the other bit 
value (1 or 0) with a probability 1PC. In the same way, Eve’s 
behavior is simulated so that if the value of her variable of 
basis coincides with that of the channel, she gets the right bit. 
Otherwise the result she gets is random, as predicted by 
quantum theory. 
In the random substitution attack, the eavesdropper chooses 
a basis bi” at random, and also a random data bit di”; she 
substitutes the i-th photon (which encodes bit di in bi basis) 
with a new photon which represents di” bit in bi” basis. In our 
program, Eve replaces a 0 bit on the channel with a probability 
defined by a variable called SUBS, and a 1 bit with a 
probability 1SUBS. The same probabilities are used to 
replace channel bases.  
IV. RESULTS 
We have computed the probability of detection of an 
eavesdropping while performing the two above mentioned 
attacks. For each one, we have studied the variation of Pdetection 
as a function of the number of transmitted photons. Several 
calculations have been made, varying the value of PC (we have 
considered values from PC = 0 to PC = 0.9 in steps of 0.15), 
and simulating possible channel inefficiencies by the inclusion 
of a noise parameter in the channel module.  
A.  Intercept-resend attack 
Fig. 3 shows the probability of detection of an eavesdropper in 
the BB84 protocol as a function of the number of photons 
transmitted. The channel is assumed without noise and a 
comparison is made between the plots obtained for different 
values of the parameter PC. 
As can be observed, the value of PC highly influences the 
probability of detection of the eavesdropper when there is no 
noise in the channel. In fact, if the number of photons 
transmitted is greater than 25, the probability of detecting the 
eavesdropper is higher than 0.9, except if PC = 0.9. 
Channel module in PRISM is modified in order to simulate 
a noisy channel so that the probability of the information sent 
by Alice (base and bit) remain unchanged before being 
received by Eve is 40%. Calculations are repeated and results 
are shown in Fig. 4.   
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Fig. 3. Probability of detection of Eve as a function of the number of photons 
emitted for different values of PC, when a noiseless channel is considered. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Probability of detection of Eve as a function of the number of photons 
emitted for different values of PC, when a noisy channel is considered. 
 
In this case, i.e., if the channel is noisy, the eavesdropper is 
detected with a probability higher than 0.9 if only 10 photons 
are transmitted, for all values of PC. 
 A comparison of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 reveals that in a noisy 
channel the value of the probability that Eve obtains the 
correct bit value although an incorrect basis is chosen for her 
measurement has almost negligible influence in the probability 
of detection of the attack. Moreover, in the presence of noise 
the probability of detection of Eve increases. This result is 
similar to that presented in [37], although it differs from what 
is concluded in a very recent paper [38]. 
B. Random substitution attack 
As for the previous attack, the probability of detection of 
Eve as a function of the number of photons transmitted in a 
channel without noise is shown in Fig. 5 for different values of 
the PC parameter.  
It can be noted that, in this case, there is almost no difference 
between the calculated probabilities for different values of PC. 
When calculations were repeated considering a noisy channel 
the values obtained were the same (shown as a wide green line 
in Fig. 5). In this simulation, if the number of transmitted 
photons is greater than 10, the probability that Eve is detected 
is higher than 0.9, for each value of PC considered. 
This result indicates that the random substitution attack 
produces a high probability of Eve’s detection regardless the 
channel noise (as could be expected, because in this scenario 
Eve’s behavior is similar to the way how noise, at random, 
modifies the transmitted bits).  
 
Fig. 5. Probability of detection of Eve as a function of the number of photons 
emitted for different values of PC in a channel without noise. Results for a 
noisy channel are also shown. 
 
By comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 5 it can be observed that, in a 
perfect channel, Eve is more likely to be detected if she uses a 
random substitution attack, even with small values of N. In 
presence of noise or imperfections in the operating devices the 
probability of detecting the eavesdropper is quite similar for 
both attacks. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, the interest of formally verifying the security 
of an experimental QKD system, by describing possible 
problems which can cause imperfections in the quantum 
channel, has been pointed out. By using a probabilistic model 
checker, the probability of detecting an eavesdropper is 
calculated for both an intercept-resend attack and a random 
substitution attack. Results show that as the channel becomes 
noisier the probability of Eve’s detection increases.  
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